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ABSTRACT 
 
White and Gorard make important and relevant criticisms of some of the methods 
commonly used in social science research, but go further by criticising the logical 
basis for inferential statistical tests. This paper comments briefly on matters we 
broadly agree on with them and more fully on matters where we disagree. We agree 
that too little attention is paid to the assumptions underlying inferential statistical 
tests, to the design of studies, and that p-values are often misinterpreted. We show 
why we believe their argument concerning the logic of inferential statistical tests is 
flawed, and how White and Gorard misrepresent the protocols of inferential 
statistical tests, and make brief suggestions for rebalancing the statistics curriculum. 
 
Keywords: Teaching statistics; Abuse of statistics; Inferential statistics;   
Significance testing 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
White and Gorard (WG) present a number of interlinked arguments. We summarise 
the arguments in their paper briefly. 
 Social scientists are using the wrong methods to understand social phenomena; 
o Too little attention is paid to the assumptions underlying inferential statistical 
tests (IST) (notably representativeness), so conclusions are often invalid; 
o IST has led to intellectual laziness where a set of mathematical techniques is used 
as a substitute for thinking about the phenomena being studied; 
o p-values are often misinterpreted; 
 There are better things to do with curriculum time than teach IST; 
 There is a long standing consensus in the statistical community that the logic 
underpinning IST is wrong; 
o These logical flaws extend to a family of techniques such as p-values, confidence 
intervals (CI), and standard errors; 
 Social scientists who use IST are aware of these faults (poor methodology, illogical 
reasoning, flawed mathematics) but persist because these faults are deeply 
enculturated, and it is easier to conform to cultural norms (and have their work 
published) than to kick against the pricks. 
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2. AREAS OF BROAD AGREEMENT 
 
We fundamentally agree with White and Gorard about their clarion call for a sea 
change in the ways that social science is conducted. We refer to two further papers that 
illustrate some of the maladies of social science research, and show that the community is 
aware of current bad practice. The Open Science Collaboration (2015) – actually Nosek 
and 269 co-authors – set out to replicate the results of 98 papers published in 3 well-
regarded psychology journals. Only 39 out of 100 replications (two studies were 
replicated twice) were successful. “Low power research designs combined with 
publication bias favouring positive results together produce a literature with upwardly 
biased effect sizes’’ (p. 6). The instability of p-values for t-tests on samples of around the 
size typically reported in psychology journals, drawn repeatedly from two populations 
where the effect size has been chosen to be typical of psychology experiments is 
remarkable (see Cumming 2012, or Cumming, n.d.); CIs are more stable. We return to 
these issues later. 
Ioannidis (2005), in his much-cited paper Why most published research findings are 
false offers a critique of methodology in social science, and asserts: 
“A research finding is less likely to be true when the studies conducted in the field 
are smaller; when effect sizes are smaller; when there is a greater number and lesser 
preselection of tested relationships; where there is greater flexibility in designs, 
definitions, outcomes, and analytic modes; where there is greater financial and other 
interest or prejudice; and where more teams are involved in a scientific field.”  
Statistical inference is often employed to use data from a sample to estimate some 
parameter in a population, and to test an hypothesis about one or more parameters in a 
population. Statistical inference is only appropriate when one is confident that the sample 
is representative of the population (so it is important to avoid sample bias). WG argue 
that this is usually impossible in social science research. We broadly agree with the 
observations that WG have to make about the cavalier approach to the use of significant 
tests and confidence intervals etc., in contexts where the requirements for their use are not 
met. We also broadly agree with the observations they make about the misstatement of 
conclusions – there is a widespread sloppiness which encourages fallacious 
misinterpretation of probabilistic reasoning (including ‘bright line’ rules around the 
sanctity of p < 0.05). These are extremely important issues and deserve more attention 
than they currently attract. For us, these are amongst the most important arguments made 
in the WG paper; far too little of the resource available for social science research is 
devoted to large scale studies, or replication. There is too little of what WG call 
‘sophisticated description’ and ‘judgement based analysis’. Some social scientists act as if 
the use of a particular methodology – Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) – 
will overcome problems associated with poor design; the rationale for NHST is often 
misunderstood and misused. 
We also agree that most textbooks on statistics place too much emphasis on NHST 
(without specifying the situations where NHST is and is not appropriate), and too little 
emphasis on issues of design (such as sampling) and how the interpretation of outcomes 
of NHST should be expressed. Mind on Statistics (Utts and Heckard, 2015) is an example 
of a textbook where key issues in NHST are addressed properly. 
We agree that p-values are often misinterpreted. The American Statistical Association 
(ASA) statement on p-values (2016) makes the following 6 points:  
1. p-values can indicate how incompatible the data are with a specified statistical model.  
2. p-values do not measure the probability that the studied hypothesis is true, or the 
probability that the data were produced by random chance alone.  
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3. Scientific conclusions and business or policy decisions should not be based only on 
whether a p-value passes a specific threshold.  
4. Proper inference requires full reporting and transparency.  
5. A p-value, or statistical significance, does not measure the size of an effect or the 
importance of a result.  
6. By itself, a p-value does not provide a good measure of evidence regarding a model 
or hypothesis.  
 
3. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT 
 
We now address some points of disagreement with WG, starting with the assertion 
that there is a general agreement that the logic underpinning IST is flawed. On page 53 
WG state “Many commentators now generally agree that ISTs do not work as intended”. 
In contrast to this assertion, the ASA statement on p-values is just concerned about 
improving the practice of NHST and communicating its proper meaning; it does not say 
ISTs do not work as intended.The ASA will host a symposium on statistical inference 
entitled Scientific Method for the 21st Century: A World Beyond p<0.05 in the fall of 
2017.  
“We’re advancing statistical inference to advance research: Building on the American 
Statistical Association’s statement on p-values, this symposium will focus attention 
on specific approaches for improving practice across three broad sets of activities:  
 Conducting research in the 21st century 
 Using research in the 21st century 
 Sponsoring, disseminating, reproducing, and replicating research in the 21st 
century” ASA (2017). 
Next, we will assert that WG misrepresent NHST protocols, and that abandoning 
NHST amounts to throwing the baby out with the bathwater. We will: 
 set out the logical basis of hypothesis testing and CI; 
 set out some statistics fundamentals that relate to NHST 
 make some observations about NHST and experimental design related to sample size; 
 explain why we think CI and effect sizes are useful. 
 
3.1.  THE LOGICAL BASIS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
We begin by pointing to an inconsistency in WG. WG suggest (p. 59) “Older 
methods, such as permutation analysis, that was impractical when first developed by 
Fisher, is now possible because of increased computing power, and can be used as a 
superior alternative to ISTs in randomised controlled trials”. This is problematic from 
their point of view; permutation analysis (PA) is IST. Consider the simple case of judging 
whether girls are better than boys on a shoot-em-up computer game. Performance data are 
gathered from girls and boys. PA works by pooling all the scores and partitioning them 
into two groups via some method of random allocation. An appropriate statistic (say the 
difference between the means) is then calculated for the two groups of scores, and is 
recorded. This is repeated a large number of times. The resulting distribution is then 
examined: how often does a value as large or larger than the one actually observed occur 
when the individual scores have been partitioned via a random process? If it occurs about 
half the time, one is likely to conclude that there is nothing to explain – these girls and 
boys perform at about the same level. If the observed mean difference in the girls’ scores 
over the boys’ scores actually occurred only once in 10 000 trials when scores are 
allocated to groups via a random process, one is likely to conclude that there is something 
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to explain. Notice that the PA allows us to draw conclusions only about observed scores – 
is there something to explain? It tells us nothing about either girls and boys, or shoot-em-
up games. Any inference about matters of substance depends on judgements about the 
quality of the data in the context of the design of the study.  
Tools for teaching with and conducting PA are readily available (e.g., Lock, Lock, 
Lock-Morgan, Lock, & Lock, 2013). Personal experience of teaching social science MA 
students – who need to read and understand articles in academic journals, but have no 
prior knowledge of statistics – via PA (starting with hands-on simulations of the 
technique) shows that this is an effective way to teach about the proper interpretation of 
‘p < 0.05’. We note in passing that PA makes no assumptions about distributions, so can 
be applied to any data sets. PA is useful, but not as useful as conventional NHST based 
on assumptions of normality, when these assumptions apply, or where samples are large 
enough for the Central Limit Theorem to apply to the sampling distribution of the mean.  
In the following sections, we move from PA to NHST as it is usually applied, and 
contrast our ideas about the logic of NHST with those of WG. 
Informally, the logical stages of NHST in the example we have just given are: 
 identify a question of interest (are girls better at shoot-em-up games than are boys?); 
 gather relevant evidence via a well-designed study; 
 analyse the data – are any differences observed consistent with the behaviour 
expected or observed with a plausible random mechanism? (either a parametric model 
or PA). If not, look for another explanation, i.e., the alternative hypothesis. 
 
More formally, a NHST requires both a null and an alternative hypothesis to be stated 
before any analysis is done (this should be done before data is collected). The null 
hypothesis (H0) must provide a sampling distribution for the statistic of interest (for 
example the mean of a distribution), and the alternative hypothesis (H1) must allow you to 
identify what will constitute the most unusual outcomes if the null hypothesis were true.  
We largely agree with the first part of WG (p. 55)  
“This approach [NHST] can only tell us, via p-values, the probability of a difference 
or relationship at least as large or strong as that observed in our sample if our 
hypothesis was true in the first place: p(D | H0). To create this probability at all it has 
to be assumed that the null hypothesis is true.”  
We disagree with the second sentence – this probability does not require an 
assumption that H0 is true – it is the probability of obtaining these data, or data less likely 
than the data actually observed, if H0 is true. There is an important distinction here in the 
logic: it does not create the circular argument WG claim. In addition, we disagree that this 
is all that NHST can tell us – we return to CI later. 
Contrast this with the account given by WG (p. 55): “As researchers, what we want to 
know is the probability of the null hypothesis being true (or false) given the data 
obtained, or p(H0 | D). We want to know the probability that the difference or relationship 
that we observed in the sample (or experimental data) is due to the vagaries of random 
sampling (or allocation) rather than being a true reflection of data in our population.”  
Researchers might want to know the probability of the null hypothesis being true 
[p(H0 | D)], but this is unknowable. The ASA statement on the interpretation of p-values 
makes it clear that NHST does not give p(H0 | D) – and does not suggest that this is 
problematic. 
WG argue that the following examples have the same logical structure: 
“If H0 is true, then the data obtained would probably not occur. 
But this result has occurred. 
Therefore, H0 is probably not true. 
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If a person is an American, then he is probably not a member of Congress. 
But this person is a member of Congress. 
Therefore, he is probably not an American.” 
 
We disagree that this analysis sheds any light on the logic of the NHST: the 
fundamental problem is that one cannot use being a member of Congress as a test of 
being an American. NHST requires both a null hypothesis which generates a sampling 
distribution for the statistic of interest, and an alternative hypothesis which identifies what 
would be the most extreme observations. If the observation falls into that extreme 
category, then the conclusion would be to reject the null hypothesis and conclude there 
was evidence to suggest it is not true. However, being a member of Congress is proof 
absolute that the person IS an American, not evidence to suggest that they are not. 
Further, NHST is designed to facilitate statements about samples (e.g., is it plausible that 
two samples are drawn from the same population?) not about individuals. 
NHST makes no claims about p(H0 | D), and so does not conflate conditional 
probabilities. 
 
3.2.  NHST: STATISTICS FUNDAMENTALS 
 
Statistics is about making sense of incomplete information, to support decision 
making in the face of uncertainty. A key issue is to know something about the quality of 
the information collected. When dealing with incomplete knowledge, you don’t know 
everything, but you also don’t know nothing – knowing where you are on that continuum 
is valuable, and it is an integral part of how hypothesis tests can provide valuable 
information on which to base decisions. WG (p. 59) say “We both use an exercise 
involving a bag filled with two different colours of marbles to demonstrate to students 
why probabilities can only be calculated if an assumption is first made about the contents 
of the bag. This helps them to understand how making such an assumption is necessarily 
incompatible with trying to find out whether that assumption is actually true.”  
We assume that this is the example used in Gorard (2014, p. 4): “Of course, the 
probability of getting seven reds from a bag containing 80 reds is different, a priori, to the 
probability of getting seven reds from a bag containing 20 reds. But the significance test 
is conducted post hoc. There is no way of telling what the remaining population is from 
the sample alone.”  
The example appears to conflate two different statistical tools; one where one has 
some a priori belief about the population (‘the factory marble bagging machine should 
put 80% reds and 20% blues into each bag’), where NHST is appropriate, and the other 
where the content is unknown, i.e., one is using a sample to estimate proportions of reds 
and blues in the population, where CI is the appropriate approach.  
For the NHST, one needs a null hypothesis, and one can make a judgement about its 
plausibility, based on evidence. One can estimate the composition of the marbles in the 
bag – this ability to make plausible predictions in the face of uncertainty is part of what 
makes statistics useful. On the evidence of 7 reds and three blues in a random sample of 
10 marbles taken from a bag with 100 marbles in it, it is far less likely that no reds remain 
in the bag than that 63 reds remain in the bag; one would be foolish to gamble otherwise.  
A key issue is to know something about the quality of the information collected. One 
of the strengths of using the NHST framework (assuming a well-designed study) is that 
the power function of the test, and effect size, taken alongside the p-value, give a good 
assessment of the likely robustness of the evidence collected – including showing when 
there is simply not enough data on which to make a decision with any degree of certainty. 
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3.3.  NHST AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: SAMPLE SIZE 
 
The effect size is an important component in the design of NHST: the standard 
deviation of the underlying population effectively determines how easy, or otherwise, it 
will be to pick up any specified difference in means, and allows researchers to calculate, 
in the design phase, what sample size should be used.  
The importance of this can be illustrated by the following example: the distribution of 
male adult heights in the UK can be modelled reasonably by a Normal distribution with 
mean 178 cm and standard deviation 10 cm. A 10% difference in the height of two groups 
would represent a very large effect size indeed (1.78) and one would expect to be able to 
identify this difference even on the basis of small samples. In contrast, a 10% difference 
in the means of two uniform distributions (the initial one on the unit interval) reflects a 
tiny effect size (0.173) and one would need a huge amount of data (a sample size more 
than 100 times greater than for the effect size of 1.78) to detect the difference, reliably. 
The important lessons from the Open Science Collaboration (2015) and Ioannidis 
(2005) are that the mechanics of null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) based on 
the Normal distribution can be used to explain why so many replications failed (Open 
Science Collaboration) and why ‘most published research findings are false’ (Ioannidis). 
We agree with WG that much social science research is badly done, but argue that some 
of the problems arise because the mathematical modelling underpinning NHST has been 
ignored, and not because of flaws in the logic of hypothesis testing per se.  
The mathematics surrounding NHST provides some principles for research design. 
Small samples do not provide good evidence on which to make decisions, but how large 
should a sample be if it is to provide reasonably robust insight? If an effect size is chosen 
which the researcher feels constitutes an important difference, then the minimum sample 
size needed in order for the test to have a specified power in detecting that size of 
difference can be calculated. Note that the calculation of minimum sample size has three 
inputs – the significance level to be used in the test, the effect size which is felt to be 
important, and the desired power of the test. The smaller the effect size to be detected 
(i.e., to return an observed value in the critical region of the test, and hence a significant 
p-value) the larger the sample size needed; the smaller the significance level chosen, the 
larger the sample size needed; and the greater the power of the test required, the larger the 
sample size needed (for more details, see Nicholson and McCusker, 2016). 
 
3.4.  WHY CI AND EFFECT SIZES ARE USEFUL 
 
With a random sample, the sample mean is the best available point estimate of the 
population mean. However, the CI uses the variability of the underlying population and 
the sample size to construct an interval estimate which improves the quality of 
information available from the estimation process by providing some idea of how precise 
the estimate is (in a non-technical sense of ‘precise’).  
On page 7, WG reproduce a paragraph we wrote in responding to their expression of 
interest in submitting to this special issue, this paragraph was written to correct a 
definition offered by WG: 
“If the variance is known, then 95% of the sample means observed will lie in an 
interval centred on the true population mean (whatever it is) which is the same width 
as the confidence interval constructed around that sample mean. There is a 1-1 
correspondence between the times the 95% CI captures the true value of the 
population mean and the times that the sample mean lies within 1.96 standard errors 
of the mean.” 
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But WG then say that whether our observation is true or not is irrelevant. They argue 
that to know the variance of a sampling distribution you need to know the population 
mean. If that were true there would be no need to construct a CI. They conclude the 
paragraph by saying: 
“Therefore, if we know the true variance there is no point in estimating an estimated 
range for that true mean. We can simply compute exactly how far any sample mean is 
from the actual mean (and even that sounds like a completely pointless activity).” 
NHST and CI protocols recognise that there is no way to determine the true 
population mean or variance through taking a sample. However, we can make estimates 
of both these parameters – and if a large representative sample is used, these can provide 
useful, bounded, approximations. The sample mean is the best point estimate and the CI 
gives valuable information about the precision of knowledge available from the sample.  
WG (p. 54) rightly point out that “statistical significance is not the same as 
substantive significance”, because of the conflating role of the sample size. Decisions on 
whether or not to implement an intervention are often made on the basis of anticipated 
effect sizes and estimates of the costs associated with obtaining those effect sizes, if there 
is evidence to suggest (via a statistically significant outcome with a robust sample size) 
that the intervention makes a substantive difference, but p-values on their own do not 
measure effect size, i.e., they do not give any insight into whether a significant difference 
is important. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
WG make important and relevant criticisms of some of the methods commonly used 
in social science research, often reflected in social science courses on research methods: 
too little attention is paid to the assumptions underlying IST, which can invalidate the 
conclusions drawn, and p-values are often misinterpreted. Too much time is devoted in 
introductory statistics courses to NHST, too little attention is paid to the design of studies, 
and too little attention to ‘sophisticated description’ and ‘judgement based analysis’. We 
are in broad agreement with these ideas; our own work focuses heavily on ‘sophisticated 
description’ of large scale data. 
The important points of disagreement centre on the logic underpinning NHST, and on 
the usefulness of confidence intervals and effect sizes. WG seem (paradoxically) to 
accept the usefulness of PA, even though this is IST. For us, the mathematical apparatus 
surrounding NHST is useful both in explaining the phenomena of low rates of replication 
reported by the Open Science Foundation (2015), and in designing studies with 
appropriate statistical power. We would advocate approaches to teaching statistics that 
introduce IST via PA, and use simulations to demonstrate phenomena such as the 
instability of p-values, and the relationships between effect size to be detected, power, 
and sample size perhaps using the Open Science Foundation (2015) paper as a stimulus.  
We agree with WG that researchers and students should be encouraged to make 
qualitative judgements about the likely robustness of results, and about the likelihood of 
replication. Publishers should ensure that textbooks are vetted carefully by both 
statisticians and social science researchers before publication. 
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